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him and rolled over the top of him.

He sustained a crushed

pelvis, denervated perineam, resulting in a patulous and
uncontrolled anal sphincter.

This necessitated a left colostomy.

His residual injuries consist of total urinary incontinence,
total neurological impotence and retrograde ejaculation, a
partial sciatic nerve injury and deformities resulting from the
pelvic fracture.

(Findings of Fact number 1.)

The Insurance Company of North America/AETNA (hereinafter
"the insurance carrier11) is the worker's compensation carrier for
the employer.

The insurance carrier paid all medical bills

arising out of the accident.

It also paid temporary total

disability compensation commencing with the date of the accident
and continuing until January 16, 1984.
The plaintiff has been under the treatment of several
physicians since the date of the accident, including a Dr.
Douglas Schow.

A medical report from Dr. Schow dated December 5,

1983 indicated that the plaintiff's combined injuries resulted in
a 79% permanent partial disability rating.

(Findings of Fact

number 2.)
On January 16, 1984, the insurance carrier, on its own,
assumed that the plaintiff had become permanently and totally
disabled and began paying the applicant permanent total
disability benefits on a weekly basis at the rate of $196.00 per
week, which represented 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the plaintiff's injury.

(Findings of Fact number 4.)

The insurance carrier paid disability benefits from January
16, 1984 through and including March 10, 1986, at the rate of
9

$196*00 per week.

The total paid by the insurer to the plaintiff

for his injury for combined temporary total impairment, total
permanent impairment and permanent partial impairment is
$61,152.00.

The insurance carrier and the employer have denied

further liability for the accident in question.

(Findings of

Fact number 5.)
The plaintiff was off work from the date of the injury
through and induing May 15, 1985.

On May 15, 1985, the

plaintiff became employed and has been continuously employed from
that date.

(Findings of Fact number 3.)

The plaintiff was

temporarily totally disabled from October 9, 1980 until May 15,
1985.

Since May 15, 1985, the applicant has suffered a permanent

partial disability of 79% of the whole man.
The administrative law judge below required the insurance
carrier to pay the plaintiff compensation at the rate of $196.00
per week until such time as it had paid a total of $61,152.00
representing 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the plaintiff's injury, payable over a period of 312 weeks.
Further, the administrative law judge ordered the employer and
the insurance carrier to pay all medical expenses incurred as a
result of the accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial
Commission.
The plaintiff filed a timely motion for review with the
Industrial Commission on December 31, 1985, and that motion for
review was denied by the board of review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah on January 21, 1986.

From that denial of

plaintiff's motion for review, the applicant has filed a timely
appeal to this court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff alleges that the Commission has erred as
follows:

first, that the Industrial Commission has erred in

tailing to allow him benefits and compensation for one 312-week
maximum period of temporary total disability and for another
312-week maximum period of permanent partial disability; and,
second, that the Industrial Commission has failed as a matter of
law to calculate accurately the amount of benefits to which the
plaintiff is entitled.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-65 (1953, as amended)
provides that a person entitled to worker's compensation benefits
may receive benefits for temporary total disability up to a
maximum of 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight
years from the date of the injury.

In addition, Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1953, as amended) provides that a
person entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits may
receive permanent partial disability benefits not exceeding in
any case 312 weeks.

These statutes should be construed such that

the plaintiff in this case is entitled to receive benefits for
temporary total disability benefits up to a maximum of 312 weeks
at the state average weekly wage at the time of the accident and,
in addition, is entitled to receive permanent partial disability
benefits up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly
wage for a period of 312 weeks.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff accepts the Findings of Fact as enunciated by
the administrative law judge.

Since the Commission did not enter

its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it must be
assumed that the Commission has adopted the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of the administrative law judge. Giles v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 692 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984).
The employer and the insurance carrier have not appealed the
decision of the Commission and, therefore, it should be assumed
that they also accept the Findings of Fact of the administrative
law judge, as adopted by the Commission.
Hence, there is no factual issue before this Court.

The

only issue before this Court is an issue of law, namely the
interpretation of apparently conflicting statutes, and/or an
award of benefits as authorized by law based upon the facts as
found by the administrative law judge and adopted by the
Commission.
Since this Court is reviewing a question of law, the
decision of the Commission below is entitled to no deference
whatsoever in this Court.

Board of Education of Alpine v. Olsen,

684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984).

The court in Olsen stated:

In reviewing interpretations of general law, . . . we
apply a correction-of-error standard with no deference
to the expertise of the Commission. (At page 51.)
The Court is wholly free to consider the issues now raised

on appeal by the plaintiff and is wholly free to correct any
error it may find in the decision of the Conmiission.
POINT II
THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO
RECEIVE BENEFITS UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 312 WEEKS AT
100% OF THE STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE AT THE TIME
OF HIS ACCIDENT AND, IN ADDITION, IS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE BENEFITS FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF COMPENSATION UP TO A
MAXIMUM OF 312 WEEKS,
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-65 (1953, as amended)
reads as follows:
35-1-65. TEMPORARY DISABILITY—AMOUNT OF
PAYMENTS--STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE DEFINED. (1) In
case of temporary disability, the employee shall
receive 66-2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages
at the time of the injury so long as such disability is
total, but not more than a maximum of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such
dependent children, not to exceed the average weekly
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of injury. In no case shall such compensation
benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
over a period of eight years from the date of the
injury. (Emphasis added.)
In addition, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1953, as
amended), in pertinent part, states as follows:
The commission may make a permanent partial disability
award at any time prior to eight years after the date
of injury to an employee whose physical condition
resulting from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who
files an application for such purpose prior to the
expiration of such eight-year period.

In the case of the following injuries the
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of that employee's
6

average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not
more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45.00 per week plus .$5.00 for a
dependent spouse and $5.00 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such
dependent children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated
for such injuries respectively, and shall be in
addition to the compensation provided for temporary
total disability and temporary partial
disability, '. T\ I

For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily
function not otherwise provided for herein, such period
of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable
and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this
section but not exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which
shall be considered the period of compensation for
permanent total loss of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all
subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no
event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a
total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be
paid. (Emphasis added.)
The above-cited statutory provisions make clear that an
injured employee entitled to receive worker's compensation
benefits is entitled to receive both of the following:
(1) temporary total disability benefits not to exceed 312 weeks
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the
injury; and, (2) permanent partial disability benefits up to a
maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury for a total of 312 weeks.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1953, as amended) is
7

in direct contradiction with the provisions of Sections 35-1-65
and 35-1-66 • The last paragraph of Section 35-1-67 reads as
follows:
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier
be required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind as provided in Sections
35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks.
The Commission, in reliance upon the quoted portion of
Section 35-1-67, ruled that the employer and the insurance
carrier herein are obligated to pay to plaintiff only 85% of the
state average weekly wage for 312 weeks, and denied the
plaintiff's claim for additional benefits.

This decision of the

Commission was improper as a matter of law, and the conflict
between the provisions of Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 on the one
hand and Section 35-1-67 on the other should be resolved in favor
of allowing the plaintiff all the benefits guaranteed to him
under Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66.
To resolve the apparent contradiction between the statutory
provisions of 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and 35-1-67, it is necessary to
turn to the rules promulgated by this Court in interpreting
statutes and resolving apparent contradictions between statutes.
One principle enunciated by this Court in resolving
contradictions between statutory provisions can be found in the
case of Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

The Madsen

decision stated:
[I]n cases of apparent conflict between provisions of
the same statute, it is the Court's duty to harmonize
and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court
cannot presume that the legislature intended to create
8

a conflict. Where contradictory
the provision susceptible of but
control those susceptible of two
thereby be rendered harmonious.
Sections 254 and 255 (1974).

provisions are passed,
one meaning will
if the statute can
73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes,

In the instant case, as in the Madsen case, we are
confronted with an apparent conflict between provisions of the
same statute.

Unfortunately, however, unlike the Madsen

situation, all statutory provisions in issue here are susceptible
of but one meaning.

Section 35-1-65 is susceptible only of the

meaning that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total
disability benefits up to a maximum of 100% of the state average
weekly wage for 312 weeks.

Section 35-1-66 is susceptible only

of one meaning, that the plaintiff is entitled to receive
permanent partial disability benefits for any permanent partial
disability he may suffer up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage for 312 weeks.

Section 35-1-67 is

susceptible of only one meaning, that the insurance carrier and
employer are obligated for a combination of temporary total
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits and
permanent total disability benefits up to a maximum total of 85%
the state average weekly wage for a period of 312 weeks.
Another rule of statutory construction adopted by this Court
is that specific statutory provisions prevail over more general
expressions.

Osuala v. AETNA Life and Casualty, 608 P.2d 242

(Utah 1980).

In the case now before the Court, the more specific

provisions are the provisions which would grant the plaintiff the
relief he is seeking.

Section 35-1-65 is very specific that the
Q

plaintiff is entitled to receive benefits up to a maximum of 100%
of the state average weekly wrage for 312 weeks for his temporary
total disability.

Section 35-1-66 is very specific that the

plaintiff is entitled to receive benefits for his permanent
partial disability up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage for a period of 312 weeks.

The contradictory

provision contained in Section 35-1-67 is a more general
statutory expression which attempts to limit on a broader scope
the provisions of a number of more specific statutes.

Pursuant

to the Osuala decision, the specific provisions of Sections
35-1-65 and 35-1-66 should govern over the more general statute,
Section 35-1-67.
Further, Section 35-1-67 is a provision dealing solely with
permanent total disability benefits.

The portion of the statute

relied on below to deny the plaintiff the relief sought is the
last paragraph of the section of the Utah Code establishing
permanent total disability benefits. That last paragraph should,
therefore, be read narrowly to apply only in cases of permanent
total disability.

Since the plaintiff is not permanently and

totally disabled, Section 35-1-67 would not apply here.
The most important principle enunciated by this Court in
construing statutes is that the Court will look to the broader
reason and purpose of the legislation to determine how conflicts
should be resolved.

In the case of Reagan Outdoor Advertising,

Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah
1979), this Court stated:
One of the cardinal principles of statutory
10

construction is that the courts will look to the
reason, spirit and sense of the legislation, as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject. (At page 783.)
The Qsuala court, supra, stated:
There are some cardinal rules of statutory construction
to be considered in relation to this controversy. If
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or
application of the provisions of an act, it is
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in the
light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions
in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.
It is proper for the Court to consider the broad general
legislative purpose and intent in adopting the workerfs
compensation statutes in order to resolve the statutory conflict
now in issue.

The clear purpose of the worker's compensation

statutes in the State of Utah can be found in Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-45, which provides that every employee
who is injured and the dependents of every such employee who is
killed by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment shall be entitled to receive compensation for the
loss.

The purpose of the worker's compensation act was set forth

in the case of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 197 P.2d
487 (Utah 1948).

The court there held that the intention of the

worker's compensation act was to secure workers and their
dependents against becoming objects of charity, by making
reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to employment,
and to make human wastage in industry part of the cost of
production for the employers and their insurance carriers.
In the present case, the Court should resolve the statutory
conflict in question in favor of furthering the broad remedial
11

purposes of the worker's compensation act and the purpose of
providing reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to
employment.

This Court should resolve the statutory conflict by

finding that the plaintiff herein is entitled to receive
temporary total disability benefits for the period of his
temporary total disability, October 9, 1980 through May 15, 1985,
at 100% the state average weekly wage at the time of his injury.
This award would be pursuant to Section 35-1-65.

In addition,

this Court should find that the plaintiff is entitled to receive
compensation for his permanent partial disability as authorized
by Section 35-1-66, at 66-2/3% the state average weekly wage at
the time of his accident, payable for 79% of the 312 week
maximum.

(This is based on the plaintiff's 79% permanent partial

disability rating.)
Such an interpretation would promote the purposes of the
worker's compensation statutes in two respects.

First, it would

award the plaintiff a more appropriate level of compensation for
the horrible and debilitating injuries which he has suffered.

It

would award the plaintiff the "reasonable compensation11
contemplated in Section 35-1-45.

Second, it should be noted that

the maximum award level set forth in Section 35-1-67 (85% of the
state average weekly wage for a maximum of 312 weeks) assumes
that those individuals who have been 100% disabled such that they
are entitled to the maximum level of benefits will, at the
conclusion of the 312-week period of compensation be entitled to
receive lifelong benefits from the Second Injury Fund.

Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-67, 68 and 69 (1953, as amended).
12

In the

case now at bar, the plaintiff has sustained injuries which are
permanently and grossly debilitating, but, because of his
re-employment on May 15, 1985, he cannot be said to be
permanently and totally disabled.

It would be a serious

injustice and in contradiction to the broad remedial purposes of
the worker's compensation laws to grant him only compensation at
85% the state average weekly wage for a maximum of 312 weeks,
since this level of compensation is based on the erroneous
assumption that he will have lifelong financial assistance from
the Second Injury Fund.
The Court should order that the plaintiff is entitled to
receive benefits as follows:
(1)

temporary total disability benefits for
October 9, 1980 through May 15, 1985 (239.15
weeks) at the state average weekly wage
effective October 9, 1980 ($230.00)
$55,004.50

(2)

permanent partial disability benefits of 79%
of the 312 week maximum (246.48) at the rate
of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage
on October 9, 1980 ($153.00)

$37,711.44

TOTAL BENEFITS DUE TO PLAINTIFF

$92,715.94

AMOUNT PAID TO PLAINTIFF TO DATE

$61,152.00

BALANCE DUE TO PLAINTIFF

$31,563.94

The balance due the plaintiff should be made payable to the
plaintiff at the appropriate weekly rate of $153.00 per week.

He

should be granted a lump sum for arrearages accrued from March
10, 1986 (the date the insurance carrier last paid weekly
benefits) through the present, and the balance should be payable
at the weekly rate.
13

POINT III
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this appeal and to
receive an appropriate award of attorney's fees herein.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully
requests that this Court award him additional worker's
compensation benefits as set forth in Point of Argument II.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of May, 1986.
CORPORQN •&), WLLLIAMS

15/C. CORPOR
Attorney for Jfl
Applican

14

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for plaintiff on appeal/applicant
herein; that I caused the attached Brief of Plaintiff on
Appeal/Applicant to be served upon each of the defendants on
appeal/respondents by placing four true and correct copies of the
same in an envelope addressed to each of the following:
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY
Attorney at Law
543 East 500 South
Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
pre-paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the

&

day of

, 1986.

—z
RON
laini .f^on Appeal/

15

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000816

KENNETH JOHNSON,

*

Applicant,

*

vs.

*
*
HARSCO/HECKETT and INSURANCE COMPANY OF *
NORTH AMERICA/AETNA,
*
*
*
Defendants.
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant is
Attorney at Law.

represented

by

Mary

C.

Corporon,

The Defendant is represented by Robert J. Shaughnessy,
Attorney at Law and Colleen Richardson.

A Hearing was deemed unnecessary in this matter, there being
factual dispute. The legal issues were submitted for decision.

no

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Applicant filed a claim with the Commission on September 19,
1985 alleging that he had sustained an injury by accident arising out of or in
the course of his employment with Harsco/Heckett on the 9th day of October,
1980 at Provo, Utah. He alleged the accident occurred when a truck rolled
backwards on a hill above him and accidentally rolled over him. He sustained
9 r_r*«*c"hekrt nelvi?, den<?rvated periream resulting in a patulous and uncontrolled
anal sphincter.
This necessitated a left colostomy. His residual injuries
consist of total urinary incontinence, total neurological impotence and
retrograde ejaculation, a partial sciatic nerve injury and deformities
resulting from the pelvic fracture.
2.
The
Applicant
has
been under
the treatment
of
several
physicians. A letter from Dr. Douglas Schow dated December 5, 1983 indicates
the Applicant's combined injuries have resulted in a 79% permanent partial
impairment.
3. The Applicant was off work from the date of injury to May 15,
1985. Temporary total disability benefits were paid until January 16, 1984 at
the rate of $230.00 per week for a total of $39,198.57.
4.
On January 16, 1984, the insurance carrier began paying Mr.
Johnson permanent total benefits on a weekly basis at the rate of $196.00 and

KENNETH JOHNSON
ORDER
PAGE TWO

have continued to make payments on this basis. The payments were made at the
permanent total disability rate on the assumption the Applicant would be
permanently and totally disabled but in fact he is not. To his credit, the
Applicant has returned to work and under these circumstances the statute
mandates that he be paid permanent partial disability benefits subject to the
limitations set forth in Section 35-1-67 U.C.A. The last paragraph of that
Section provides
"In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be
required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities
of any kind as provided in Section 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this
Section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for
312 weeks".
Eighty Five percent of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the Applicant's injury was $196.00. The Administrative Law Judge finds that
the foregoing Section provides a maximum liability on the part of the employer
of $61,152.00.
Counsel for the Applicant challenges this Finding and the
Conclusion of Law based thereon and contends that the Applicant is entitled to
temporary total disability compensation for the full period of time and, in
addition thereto, to the full compensation that would otherwise be due him on
the basis of the 79% permanent partial impairment rating.
In addition to the
Section 35-1-66 provides that

foregoing

limitation,

the

third

paragraph

of

"In case the partial disability begins after a period of total
disability, the period of total disability shall be deducted
from the total period of compensation."
5. The insurance carrier has acknowledged its liability for payment
of the statutory maximum of $61,152.00.
6. The Applicant's injuries are sufficiently significant that he may
at some point in time prior to normal retirement years become permanently and
totally disabled.
Should such occur, there is no specific period of time
during which the Applicant can file his petition for permanent total
disability benefits, for now t he is limited to the maximum benefits provided
under Section 35-1-67. The insurance carrier will continue to make payments
to the Applicant until such time as the total sum of $61,152.00 has been paid
out. There remains to be paid the approximate sum of $2500.00.

KENNETH JOHNSON
ORDER
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant is entitled to Worker*s Compensation benefits as a
result of his industrial accident of October 9, 1980 in accordance with the
foregoing Findings of Fact.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants, Harsco/Heckett and/or
INA/Aetna pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $196.00 per week until
such time as it has paid the total sum of $61,152.00 representing 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the Applicant's injury payable over a
period of 312 weeks.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion'
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
_yj§^day of December, 1985.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on December
/H
1985, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the case of Kenneth Johnson
issued December
M
, 1985, was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:
Kenneth Johnson, 1709 West 120 South, Provo, UT

84601

Harsco/Heckett, P.O. Box 5, Provo, UT 84601
Colleen Richardson, INA/Aetna, 455 East South Temple, SLC. UT 84110
Mary C. Corporon, Atty., 1100 Boston Bldg., 9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 South, #3, SLC, UT 84102

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By _ ^ ^ 2 & ^
Carol Olson

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Applicant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
1100 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000816

KENNETH JOHNSON/
Applicant/

MOTION FOR REVIEW

-vsHARSCO/HECKETT and INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA/AETNA,
Defendants.

APPLICANT TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION, by and through his counsel of
record/ Mary C. Corporon, hereby requests that the decision before the
Industrial Commission of Utah in the above-referenced matter entered on or
about December 18/ 1985/ be reviewed.

In support of this Motion for

Review/ applicant specifies the following particular errors and objections
to the court's Findings, Conclusions and Order of December 18, 1985;
In its Order of December 18, 1985, the Industrial Commission of the
State of Utah has determined that applicant is entitled to receive 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the applicant's injury/
payable over a period of 312 weeks. Applicant asserts that he is entitled
to receive benefits up to a maximum of two 312 week periods of disability,
the first being for a period of temporary total disability, and the second
being for a period of permanent partial disability.

Applicant does not dispute the Findings of Fact: entered on December
18, 1985.
Utah Code Annotated/Section 35-1-65 (1981/ as amended) provides that
injured workers may receive compensation for temporary disability so long
as such disability is total.
this statute states:

The first paragraph of subsection (1) of

"In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed

312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury."
(emphasis added)
Further/
provides that

Utah

Code

Annotated/ Section 35-1-66

(1983 as amended)

injured workers may receive compensation for permanent

partial disability.

The tenth full paragraph of this statute states that

such benefits may be received but shall not exceed "...in any case 312
weeks/ which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent
total loss of bodily function."
The findings of the Industrial Commission indicate that the applicant
has suffered a period of temporary total disability from the date of his
injury on October 9/ 1980/ until May 15/ 1985/ the day applicant was able
to return to work.

Further/ the medical records and medical evidence

indicate that applicant has suffered permanent partial disability/ and
that

his

disability

rating

is a

79% permanent partial impairment.

Clearly/ applicant has suffered injury and losses in two categories/ one
being temporary total disability and the other being permanent partial
disability.
The

Utah

Code

distinguishes

clearly

disability and permanent partial disability.

between

temporary

total

Section 35-1-65 provides for

a rate of compensation and a period of compensation for temporary total

disability-

Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-66 provides for a rate of

compensation

and

disability.

period

Section

compensation
provides

a

of

35-1-65

compensation
provides

that

for
the

for temporary disability is 312 weeks.

that

the

maximum

disability is 312 weeks.

term of compensation

permanent
maximum

partial
term

of

Section 35-1-66

for temporary total

These two statutory provisions should be read

independently/ and should be read as providing for separate periods of
compensation

for separate classifications of loss or injury.

Hence/

applicant would be entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits
commencing September 19/ 1985 and continuing through May 15/ 1985. After
May 15/ 1985/ he would be entitled to receive temporary total disability
at the statutory rate/ based upon his terrporary total disability rating of
79% permanent partial impairment/ and he would be entitled to receive such
temporary total disability benefits for a maximum period of 312 weeks
commencing May 15/ 1985.
The Administrative Law Judge in entering the order of December 18/
1985 has relied on Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 (1985 as amended)
for the proposition that the maximum period of compensation to which
applicant is entitled is 312 weeks.
circumstances
disabled.

First/ this section applies only to

in which an injured worker

is permanently and totally

Clearly/ this does not apply to applicant in the instant case.

For this reason/ applicant benefits should be computed under Sections
35-1-65 and 35-1-66/ and not under the statutory provision dealing with
permanent

total

disability.

Further/

to

the

extent that the last

paragraph of Section 35-1-67 is applicable to claimant's case/ it is in
direct contradiction with the provisions of Section 35-1-65 and 35-1-66.
Where

such

a conflict exists/ the remedial purposes of the Worker's

Compensation^ laws should govern/ and an applicant who has suffered these
severe injuries sustained by claimant herein should be deemed

entitled

to compensation as he has requested.
DATED this .cffi day of December, 1985.
CORPORON Sc WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Applicant

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY of the foregoing was
mailed/ postage pre-paid in the United States mail to:
P.O. Box 5/ Provo/ Utah

84601; Colleen Richardson of INA Aetna/ 455 East

South Temple/ Salt Lake City/ Utah

84110; Robert J. Shaughnessy/ Attorney

at Law, 543 East 500 South #3, Salt Lake City/ Utah
of December/ 1985.

Harsco/Heckett/

84102, this

S O day

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000816

KENNETH JOHNSON,
Applicant,
vs.
HARSCO/HECKETT and/or
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA/AETNA,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On or about December 18, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about December 31, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of December 18, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this

iphen M.
M. Had l e y
Stephen
Chairman

uic&^' ,j,
Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

Coitmussipp/Secretary

Lenice 1 L. Nielsen
Commissioner

tffyLfy*^
7?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January J?tfj^~% 1986, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Kenneth Johnson, issued
January .£/'•**• 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

Kenneth Johnson, 1709 West 120 South, Provo, UT

84601

--Mary C. Corporon, Atty., 1100 Boston Bldg., 9 Exchange Place,
SLC, UT 84111
Harsco/Heckett, P 0. Box 5, Provo, UT
INA/Aetna, Attn:
84110

84601

Colleen Richardson, P. 0. Box 390, SLC, UT

Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 Souths #3, SLC, UT
84102

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By .°t/
^^V^^__^
Wilma

